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THE LEGAL PROFESSION’S  
MONOPOLY ON THE PRACTICE OF LAW 
FOREWORD:   
THE PROFESSION’S MONOPOLY  
AND ITS CORE VALUES 
W. Bradley Wendel* 
I. 
The position of the organized bar regarding regulation—the bar’s nomos, 
as Susan Koniak terms it1—is stated right up front, in the preamble to the 
American Bar Association’s (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct.  
The legal profession aspires to be largely self-regulating, but in the 
American system, it depends on state courts to adopt and enforce the 
disciplinary rules it constructs.2  Self-regulation ensures the independence 
of the legal profession from dominance by the legislative and executive 
branches of government.3  There is a quid pro quo, however; for the bar to 
retain its privilege of self-regulation, it must adopt regulations that are “in 
 
*  Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.  I am grateful to Bruce Green for inviting me to 
write the Foreword to the proceedings of this Colloquium. 
 1. See Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1389, 
1389 (1992). 
 2. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 10 (2013).  The Restatement (Third) 
of the Law Governing Lawyers is clearer on the relationship between the organized bar and 
regulation by the judiciary:  the American Bar Association proposes model rules, which are 
approved, promulgated, and enforced by state courts—generally the highest court in a state. 
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 1 cmt. b (2000).  As a 
matter of constitutional law, the power to adopt rules for the regulation of the legal 
profession is inherent in the function of the judiciary. Id. § 1 cmt. c.  The profession in other 
common law countries, notably Canada and New Zealand, is self-regulating to a much 
greater extent than in the United States. See, e.g., DUNCAN WEBB, ETHICS:  PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAWYER 77 (2000); John M. Law, The Legal Profession and 
Lawyer Regulation in Canada, in ALICE WOOLLEY ET AL., LAWYERS’ ETHICS AND 
PROFESSIONAL REGULATION 49 (2008); Fred C. Zacharias, The Myth of Self-Regulation, 93 
MINN. L. REV. 1147 (2009).  The United Kingdom and Australia, by contrast, have recently 
undergone comprehensive regulatory reforms driven by their respective parliaments. See, 
e.g., ANDREW BOON & JENNIFER LEVIN, THE ETHICS AND CONDUCT OF LAWYERS IN ENGLAND 
AND WALES 109–29 (2008). 
 3. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 11; see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 1 cmt. d (“Self-regulation provides protection 
of lawyers against political control by the state.”). 
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the public interest and not in furtherance of parochial or self-interested 
concerns of the bar.”4  As Deborah Rhode, long a critic of the profession’s 
asserted monopoly on regulatory authority, has quipped, what distinguishes 
the American bar from a retail grocers’ association is the ability of the 
former to present self-regulation as a social value.5  The bar does not lack 
arguments in justification of its monopoly, including the traditional appeal 
to the relationship between regulatory independence and the rule of law.  
From this perspective, according to a partner at a prominent law firm, 
the ethical rules for protecting the professional independence of the bar 
need to take into account the role of the legal profession as an 
independent bulwark between individuals or organizations and the 
political branches of government.6 
Independence is a social value, in this view, because it permits the client to 
be completely candid with the lawyer who, in turn, will be in a position to 
counsel the client on compliance with the law.7  On this conception of 
independence, the legal profession should not be subject to regulation by 
government agencies, such as the SEC, which “are not in any meaningful 
way adjudicative entities whose responsibility it is to be impartial and to 
eschew political direction.”8  Protecting the rights of citizens, an essential 
aspect of the rule of law, therefore requires an independent legal profession. 
Difficulties with the traditional defense of the professional monopoly 
have long been apparent, even before the recent challenges posed by the 
globalization of the market for legal services and the potentially disruptive 
effects of information technology.  One problem is that the bar seems to 
worry about only one type of interference with the professional judgment of 
lawyers.  The bar tends to worry very much that the advice given to clients 
by their lawyers will be skewed by the lawyers’ quite understandable 
interest in avoiding legal sanctions imposed on them by government 
regulators.9  But this concern relates to only one side of the tacit bargain 
between society and the legal profession.  Lawyers enjoy the privilege of 
self-regulation so that they can practice in the public interest the craft of 
representing clients within the bounds of the law.  In order to act in the 
public interest, lawyers must also remain independent, to a significant 
 
 4. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 12. 
 5. DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE:  REFORMING THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION 143 (2000). 
 6. Evan A. Davis, The Meaning of Professional Independence, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 
1281, 1281 (2003). 
 7. In a frequently cited passage, the U.S. Supreme Court described the purpose of the 
attorney-client privilege similarly, as “to encourage full and frank communication between 
attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of 
law and administration of justice.” Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). 
 8. Davis, supra note 6, at 1289. 
 9. See, e.g., Lawrence J. Fox, The Fallout from Enron:  Media Frenzy and Misguided 
Notions of Public Relations Are No Reason To Abandon Our Commitment to Our Clients, 
2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1243, 1250–52 (worrying that overzealous SEC regulation of business 
lawyers will deprive clients of information to which they are entitled). 
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degree, from the interests of their own clients.10  The civic republican ideal 
often associated with the private practice career and writings of Justice 
Louis D. Brandeis emphasizes the legal profession’s mediating role, 
seeking to balance the interests of various factions to arrive at a socially 
desirable outcome.11  Thus, lawyers for a powerful corporation may be 
called upon to “use their influence to discourage their clients from unjust or 
antisocial projects.”12  This is a far cry from the preoccupation with the 
interests of clients that one often finds in defense of the profession’s 
monopoly on regulation.  It is clear from the bar’s response to the SEC’s 
repeated attempts to regulate securities lawyers that these lawyers are not 
thinking of themselves as wise “lawyer statesmen” who are uniquely 
positioned to deliberate about what would be best from a public-spirited 
point of view.13  Instead, after each of several repeated episodes of lawyer 
complicity in massive financial frauds by their clients, lawyers worried not 
that they were not doing enough to protect the public interest, but that 
proposed government regulations would turn them into whistleblowers or 
deputy law enforcement officers.14  Lawyers have not been observed 
clamoring for regulatory standards that increase their distance from clients.  
The bar’s own actions belie its assertions concerning the connection 
between its regulatory monopoly and the public interest. 
Another problem with the traditional defense of the regulatory monopoly 
is that the bar appears to pay only lip service to the problem of access to 
justice for poor and middle-income people.15  Outside the context of the 
right to counsel in felony criminal prosecutions,16 the law governing 
lawyers recognizes exclusively negative rights to counsel.  That is, there is 
no positive right to have a lawyer provided and paid for by public funds, 
and others are prohibited from interfering with the lawyer-client 
relationship in certain ways.17  The organized bar readily rallies to defend 
 
 10. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 13–
14 (1988). 
 11. Id. at 14 (quoting LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, The Opportunity in the Law (May 4, 1905), in 
BUSINESS—A PROFESSION 329, 337 (1933)). 
 12. WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE:  A THEORY OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS 128 
(1998). 
 13. Cf. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER:  FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION 127, 141–43 (1993) (arguing for a conception of legal ethics in which lawyers 
internalize an attitude of civic-mindedness and endeavor to set aside concerns for the private 
interests of their clients). 
 14. See, e.g., Sung Hui Kim, Lawyer Exceptionalism in the Gatekeeping Wars, 63 SMU 
L. REV. 73, 108 (2010); Susan P. Koniak, When the Hurlyburly’s Done:  The Bar’s Struggle 
with the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1236, 1270, 1273 (2003). 
 15. See, e.g., Rebecca Aviel, Why Civil Gideon Won’t Fix Family Law, 122 YALE L.J. 
2106 (2013); Roger C. Cramton, Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary Americans, 44 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 531 (1994); Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1785 (2001). 
 16. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (holding that the right to counsel 
applies to all defendants in felony crime cases). 
 17. A clear example is the anticontact rule, under which attorneys are prohibited from 
contacting opposing parties who are represented by counsel in the matter. See MODEL RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2013). 
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these negative rights, such as the attorney-client privilege, from any 
conceivable threat.18  In contrast, it is passive, for the most part, in the face 
of massive deprivations of the positive right to counsel.  To take an obvious 
example, parents facing a state proceeding seeking to terminate their 
parental rights do not have a right to publicly funded legal representation, 
even though the interest in preserving the relationship with one’s children is 
of overwhelming importance—probably more important for most parents 
than avoiding a thirty-day jail sentence for shoplifting.19  Similarly, public-
benefits claimants may require an attorney to face bureaucratic obstacles or 
opposition to obtain the benefits to which they are entitled, but the 
legislative efforts to provide an effective positive right to counsel in public-
benefits cases have mostly been laughable.20  In any event, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has held that there is no constitutional prohibition on 
requiring civil rights claimants to waive the right to recover attorney’s fees 
as a condition of settlement.21  The bar has also remained fairly quiet as 
business groups seek to intimidate and even defund law school legal clinics 
providing assistance to people suing for harms such as environmental 
damage.22  Although some bar leaders, such as the Chief Judge of the New 
York Court of Appeals, have taken concrete steps to mitigate the problem 
of access to justice,23 by and large the legal profession seems unconcerned 
that its vigorous efforts to enforce its monopoly over the provision of legal 
services is exacerbating existing social disparities. 
The legal profession has always been rhetorically committed to the 
distinction between a business and a profession24 but has nevertheless 
accommodated itself to the influences of nonlawyers in some contexts.25  
Insurance defense representation is the clearest example.  Liability insurers 
have the contractual right to control the defense of the insured’s case, 
 
 18. See, e.g., Koniak, supra note 1, at 1398–1401 (recounting an example of the bar’s 
resistance to attempts by prosecutors to issue subpoenas to defense lawyers). 
 19. See Aviel, supra note 15, at 2111. 
 20. See, e.g., Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 334–35 
(1985) (upholding a $10 cap on fees paid to attorneys to obtain death or disability benefits 
from the Veterans Administration). 
 21. Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 719–20 (1986). 
 22. Accord David Luban, Taking Out the Adversary:  The Assault on Progressive 
Public-Interest Lawyers, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 209, 225, 236–40 (2003). 
 23. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 520.16 (2013); see also Benjamin P. 
Cooper, Mandatory Pro Bono Redux:  Guest Correspondent’s Report from the United States, 
15 LEGAL ETHICS 135, 135, 138–39 (2012) (describing Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman’s 
initiative to require all law students to perform fifty hours of pro bono service as a condition 
of admission to practice in New York and describing the bar’s “level of resistance to this 
relatively minor change”). 
 24. See Ted Schneyer, “Professionalism” As Pathology:  The ABA’s Latest Policy 
Debate on Nonlawyer Ownership of Law Practice Entities, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 75, 94–
102 (2012).  Justice Sandra Day O’Connor famously relied on this distinction in her dissent 
in a lawyer advertising case. See Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 488–89 (1988) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 25. See John S. Dzienkowski, The Future of Big Law:  Alternative Legal Service 
Providers to Corporate Clients, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2995, 3001 (2014) (noting that, despite 
the bar’s resistance to multidisciplinary practices, large law firms have increasingly come to 
rely on nonlawyers to provide certain types of legal services). 
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including the hiring, supervision, and termination of counsel; access to 
confidential client information; and the settlement of the case.  Although 
the insured is, at least, the lawyer’s primary client (and, in some states, the 
sole client), defense lawyers have duties to insurers that may result in 
liability for malpractice in the event of breach.26  As a result, the traditional 
model of the attorney-client relationship, with a single client to whom the 
attorney owes undivided duties of loyalty, breaks down in the insurance-
defense context.27  The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers 
includes a curious provision recognizing certain informal methods that have 
evolved for insurance defense lawyers to deal with conflicts of interest in 
ways that would be impermissible in other contexts: 
Certain practices of designated insurance-defense counsel have become 
customary and, in any event, involve primarily standardized protection 
afforded by a regulated entity in recurring situations.  Thus a particular 
practice permissible . . . under this Section [may not be permissible] for a 
lawyer in noninsurance arrangements with significantly different 
characteristics.28 
The insurance defense problem is the dog that did not bark for the 
profession’s concern about its monopoly, independence, interference by 
nonlawyers, and core values.  Here we have nonlawyers—liability 
insurers—with their own clear commercial interests, which are opposed in 
many cases to those of both lawyers and their clients, and yet are permitted 
to exercise significant control over the conduct of litigation.  Moreover, the 
lawyers who are paid by liability insurers are permitted to fudge the rules 
on conflicts of interest.  Granting that the liability insurance contract is 
extensively regulated by state law,29 it is still difficult to reconcile the bar’s 
acquiescence in the interference by nonlawyers in the attorney-client 
relationship in this context with its vehement opposition to the ABA 
Commission on Ethics 20/20’s modest proposals for nonlawyer investments 
in law firms.30 
 
 26. See, e.g., Paradigm Ins. Co. v. Langerman Law Offices, 24 P.3d 593, 601–02 (Ariz. 
2001); Nevada Yellow Cab Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. Clark, 152 P.3d 737, 
739 (Nev. 2007).  For an example of a “single client” case that nevertheless allows a lawsuit 
by the insurer against defense counsel under an equitable subrogation theory, see Atlanta 
Int’l Ins. Co. v. Bell, 475 N.W.2d 294, 298–99 (Mich. 1991). 
 27. See, e.g., Tom Baker, Liability Insurance Contracts and Defense Lawyers:  From 
Triangles to Tetrahedrons, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 101 (1997); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Triangular 
Lawyer Relationships:  An Exploratory Analysis, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 15 (1987); Nancy 
J. Moore, The Ethical Duties of Insurance Defense Lawyers:  Are Special Solutions 
Required?, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 259 (1997); Thomas D. Morgan, What Insurance Scholars 
Should Know About Professional Responsibility, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 1 (1997); Ellen Smith 
Pryor & Charles Silver, Defense Lawyers’ Professional Responsibilities:  Part I—Excess 
Exposure Cases, 78 TEX. L. REV. 599 (2000); Ellen S. Pryor & Charles Silver, Defense 
Lawyers’ Professional Responsibilities:  Part II—Contested Coverage Cases, 15 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 29 (2001); Douglas R. Richmond, Lost in the Eternal Triangle of Insurance 
Defense Ethics, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 475 (1996); Charles Silver & Kent Syverud, The 
Professional Responsibilities of Insurance Defense Lawyers, 45 DUKE L.J. 255 (1995). 
 28. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 134 cmt. f (2000). 
 29. Cf. Kent D. Syverud, The Duty To Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1113, 1120–21 (1990). 
 30. See Schneyer, supra note 24. 
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As a fallback argument in support of the professional monopoly, the 
organized bar often appeals to consumer protection as a policy objective.  In 
contrast with the bar’s response to group legal services plans, the argument 
in these cases is not that nonlawyers will interfere with the professional 
judgment of lawyers providing legal services.  Rather, the fear is that 
nonlawyers might outcompete lawyers on pricing and induce consumers to 
entrust the protection of their rights to providers who lack the training and 
expertise to deal with complicated, sometimes esoteric legal issues.  Many 
states have unauthorized practice of law (UPL) committees that 
aggressively pursue nonlawyers who attempt to provide legal services, who, 
in many cases, are addressing the legal needs of low- and middle-income 
clients.31  The apotheosis of UPL prosecutions was the effort by the Texas 
UPL committee to block the sale of Quicken Family Lawyer, a software 
product similar to TurboTax, which allows consumers to input information 
and prepare relatively simple legal documents such as wills, advance 
healthcare directives, and residential leases.32  Although the legislature 
quickly overturned the court’s decision, the district court’s grant of an 
injunction stood briefly as almost a self-parody of the bar’s efforts to 
restrain competition.33  Now the bar faces competition not just from 
software products, but from online providers such as LegalZoom and 
Rocket Lawyer.34  LegalZoom abruptly pulled the plug on an announced 
initial public offering in August 2012,35 but its net profit of $12.1 million in 
 
 31. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d 1186, 1194 (Fla. 1978) (granting an 
injunction in a UPL action against a former legal secretary who interviewed clients in 
matrimonial matters and typed their information into legal forms); Prof’l Adjusters, Inc. v. 
Tandon, 433 N.E.2d 779, 783 (Ind. 1982) (invalidating a statute, on negative inherent power 
grounds, creating a paraprofession of “certified public adjusters” to assist insureds in making 
first-party insurance claims). See generally Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional 
Monopoly:  A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibition, 
34 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1981) (contending that, rather than protecting the public interest, the 
bar’s campaign against the unauthorized practice of law has limited access to legal services 
by poor and middle-income clients). 
 32. See Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Parsons Tech., Inc., No. Civ. A. 
2859H, 1999 WL 47235, at *1–2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 1999), vacated and remanded per 
curiam, 179 F.3d 956 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 33. In the discussion of the Quicken Family Lawyer litigation in his casebook, Stephen 
Gillers begins by assuring students that “[t]he following tale is not a spoof from The Onion.” 
STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS:  PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 647 (9th ed. 
2012). 
 34. See, e.g., Lowry v. LegalZoom.com, Inc., No. 2259, 2012 WL 2953109 (N.D. Ohio 
July 19, 2012) (dismissing a class action suit for lack of jurisdiction because the Ohio 
Supreme Court had not held that the activities of LegalZoom violated a state UPL statute); 
Janson v. LegalZoom.com, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (W.D. Mo. 2011) (denying, in part, 
LegalZoom’s motion for summary judgment in a class action filed by consumers asserting 
that LegalZoom violated a Missouri UPL statute); Pa. Bar Ass’n Unauthorized Practice of 
Law Comm., Formal Op. 2010-01 (2010) (holding that LegalZoom and similar services 
violated Pennsylvania’s UPL statute unless the services were provided by lawyers who were 
admitted to practice in Pennsylvania).  The Missouri class action subsequently settled. See 
Samson Habte, Class Action Against LegalZoom Isn’t Valid Unless State High Court Finds 
UPL Violation, 28 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 468 (2012). 
 35. See LegalZoom Delays IPO, L.A. BIZ (Aug. 3, 2012, 12:32 PM), 
http://www.bizjournals.com/losangeles/news/2012/08/03/legalzoom-delays-ipo.html. 
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the preceding year36 is fairly strong evidence that consumer demand exists 
for lower-cost alternatives to traditional models of providing legal services.  
American lawyers might be casting nervous glances across the Atlantic, 
noting that concerns about consumer protection and access to justice 
motivated comprehensive legislative regulatory reform of the legal 
profession in England and Wales.37 
The cases of LegalZoom and Quicken Family Lawyer also reveal that 
one motivation for the reassertion of the values of professionalism and 
independence is the disruptive effects of technology.  While the legal 
profession may not yet be facing the kind of existential threat that has 
revolutionized the recorded music industry, information technology has 
affected many traditional methods by which lawyers provided services to 
clients.  The most obvious, at least to practicing lawyers, is 24/7 
connectivity with clients and other lawyers, with the accompanying 
expectations of immediate responses to requests for information.  The ABA 
Commission on Ethics 20/20 amended a comment to the competence rule to 
specify that lawyers should “keep abreast of changes in the law and its 
practice, including the benefits and risks associated with relevant 
technology.”38  The Commission did not, however, provide some useful 
guidance to lawyers struggling to understand what competent representation 
requires when they are answering questions from clients on their 
smartphones, without the benefit of research, or even much time for 
reflection.39  The Commission on Ethics 20/20 did acknowledge the risk 
that electronic communication and data storage technology could pose to 
the confidentiality of client information,40 but again declined to provide 
specific guidance—perhaps wisely in this instance, given the frequency 
with which technological change occurs and the variety of threats to data 
security.  For example, a report by the New York City Bar highlighted a 
case in which a two-person law firm defending a Marine accused of 
involvement in a massacre of civilians in Haditha, Iraq, was hacked by an 
online activist group.41  The firm had stored documents online with a 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. See, e.g., John Flood, Will There Be Fallout from Clementi?  The Repercussions for 
the Legal Profession After the Legal Services Act 2007, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 537, 537–47 
(discussing the so-called Clementi report, DAVID CLEMENTI, REVIEW OF THE REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK FOR LEGAL SERVICES IN ENGLAND AND WALES:  FINAL REPORT (2004)). 
 38. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 8 (2013). 
 39. In fairness to the Commission on Ethics 20/20, what is required by reasonable care is 
a question for state tort law, but to the extent the disciplinary rule on competence overlaps 
with the law of malpractice, the ABA’s guidance would have been useful. 
 40. AM. BAR ASS’N, COMM. ON ETHICS 20/20, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 
(2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
ethics_2020/2012_hod_annual_meeting_105a_filed_may_2012.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 41. See N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N, COMM. ON SMALL LAW FIRMS, THE CLOUD AND THE SMALL 
LAW FIRM:  BUSINESS, ETHICS AND PRIVILEGE CONSIDERATIONS 10 n.10 (2013), available at 
http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20072378-TheCloudandtheSmallLawFirm.pdf; 
see also Martha Neil, Unaware ‘Anonymous’ Existed Until Friday, Partner of Hacked Law 
Firm Is Now Fielding FBI Phone Calls, A.B.A. J. (Feb. 6, 2013, 3:02 PM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/unaware_that_anonymous_hacking_group_existed_
until_friday_law_firm_partner/. 
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Google service, and the attack resulted in the disclosure of three gigabytes 
of private data, including emails between the firm and its clients.42  Model 
Rule 1.6 on confidentiality was recently amended to clarify that, in addition 
to tort and agency law duties to ensure the confidentiality of client 
information, lawyers have obligations also under the disciplinary rules.43  
How many lawyers can confidently say they use the best available 
techniques for securing their client data?  As these sorts of cases continue to 
occur, the profession will undoubtedly adapt to new technologies, whether 
it wants to or not. 
For every tradition-minded lawyer worried about the erosion of the legal 
profession’s monopoly due to the encroaching effects of technology, 
services provided by nonlawyer businesspeople, and the values of the 
marketplace, there are innovative, entrepreneurial lawyers seeking new 
ways to deliver services to clients in an efficient manner that is consistent 
with the profession’s core values.  A certain reifying tendency is common 
in critical discussions of the profession’s monopoly, including the tendency 
to assume that there is more that unites lawyers than divides them.  As John 
Heinz and Edward Laumann demonstrated and subsequently (with new 
coauthors) reconfirmed, the practicing bar is strikingly differentiated by 
client identity, area of specialization, practice setting, and socioeconomic 
status.44  For example, a plaintiff’s personal-injury lawyer handling routine 
auto accident and premises liability cases may physically practice law a few 
blocks from an in-house lawyer for Goldman Sachs, but there is almost 
certainly a huge gulf between these lawyers in terms of ethno-religious 
background, undergraduate and legal education, political affiliation, and of 
course, income.  The bar has likely become more differentiated in recent 
years.  Maybe scholars would be better off if we no longer talked about the 
profession, but analyzed regulatory and ethical issues as they apply to 
differentiated professions.  On the other hand, it may be that something of 
importance will be lost if we abandon the unified profession as an analytical 
category.  That “something” is what makes the legal profession different in 
a normatively significant way—its core values.  Too often the notion of 
core values is invoked in a question-begging way, or strategically, as a way 
 
 42. Id. 
 43. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c).  A comment to the rule gives a more 
detailed analysis of the duties of lawyers regarding electronically stored client information: 
Factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the lawyer’s efforts 
[to safeguard confidential information] include the sensitivity of the information, 
the likelihood of disclosure if additional safeguards are not employed, the cost of 
employing additional safeguards, the difficulty of implementing the safeguards, 
and the extent to which the safeguards adversely affect the lawyer’s ability to 
represent clients (e.g., by making a device or important piece of software 
excessively difficult to use). 
Id. R. 1.6 cmt. 18. 
 44. See generally JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD O. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS:  THE 
SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 6–16 (rev. ed. 1994); JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., URBAN 
LAWYERS:  THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (2005). 
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of fending off competition.45  But as the saying goes, just because you’re 
paranoid, it doesn’t mean they aren’t after you.  The profession may have 
core values that are worth preserving, even if the appeal to core values is 
sometimes a rhetorical makeweight. The most fundamental question that 
emerges in the context of the rapidly evolving market for legal services is, 
what makes lawyers worthy of special concern, i.e., what justifies their 
monopoly?  This is not an empirical question but a normative one; it is 
about the values that make the legal profession distinctive. 
A consideration is not a value, let alone a core value, unless it provides 
reasons for others to take a positive practical stance toward it—in other 
words, to approve of, support, and care about something.46  This may mean 
participating in practices that have the effect of sustaining the thing that is 
valued.47  Stated less abstractly, if something is said to be a core value of 
the legal profession, someone other than lawyers must care about it and 
wish for it to be preserved.  It may turn out that a purported core value of 
the profession, such as a nearly absolute duty of confidentiality, is actually 
less important to clients than lawyers believe.48  But there may be 
something about the role performed by the legal profession in society that is 
normatively significant from the point of view of society as a whole, not 
only from the self-interested perspective of lawyers.  Two decades ago, the 
MacCrate report attempted to define the core values around which the legal 
profession is organized.49  Despite the apparent fragmentation of the legal 
profession into numerous subgroups and specialized practice areas, the 
report argued that ethical lawyering in any context could be understood as 
responding to four fundamental values:  (1) competence; (2) promoting 
justice, fairness, and morality; (3) improving the profession and its self-
governance; and (4) one’s own professional development.50  Values (3) and 
(4) are parasitic on the first two; that is, one cannot say what counts as 
individual or collective improvement without a standard of excellence by 
which improvement may be measured.  Thus, the profession’s core values 
according to the MacCrate report are competent representation of clients 
and the promotion of the social values of justice, fairness, and morality.  
More recently the Carnegie report concluded, “Law schools fail to 
complement the focus on skill in legal analyses with effective support for 
developing ethical and social skills.”51  Once again, moral and social values 
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are held out as core concerns of the profession.  But despite the prominence 
of talk about moral and social values in professional self-study reports, it is 
difficult to come up with examples of concrete steps taken by leading 
institutions within the legal profession, such as the ABA, state and local bar 
associations, the judiciary, and the legal academy, which are directly aimed 
at increasing the responsibility of lawyers for promoting justice, fairness, 
and morality.  Mandatory pro bono and clinical education are a start, but 
providing legal services to low-income clients is only a part of what is 
meant by social justice.52  More to the point, the bar’s most vigorous 
defense of its independence generally occurs in cases where other 
institutions seek to hold lawyers responsible for promoting injustice.  The 
controversy over the SEC’s proposed Sarbanes-Oxley regulations occurred 
in the wake of financial accounting scandals, implicating the professional 
advice and assistance of elite lawyers.53  The full extent of lawyer 
participation in the misconduct underlying the 2007 global financial crisis 
has yet to be revealed, but it is a safe bet that if there are calls for additional 
regulation of the legal profession, the organized bar will be opposed. 
Scholars who assert that a core value of the legal profession is the 
promotion of justice and morality have in mind lawyers like Louis 
Brandeis, who saw themselves almost as Platonic guardians of the public 
interest.  In a frequently recounted episode, Brandeis once told his client, a 
large manufacturing firm, that its employees’ demands for higher wages 
were justified.54  The conditions under which lawyers could effectively 
serve as the conscience of their clients, particularly large corporations, are 
generally believed to no longer exist.  One reason, mentioned in many of 
the articles in the Colloquium, is the increasing power of in-house legal 
departments.55  Not only have in-house counsel exerted tremendous 
pressure for cost containment, but they have assigned work to be performed 
by outside counsel on a matter-by-matter basis, so that retained lawyers 
now provide fairly narrow, technical assistance.  It is hard to see how much 
moral advising can occur in the context of discrete, transactional 
relationships between outside lawyers and corporate clients.  In-house 
lawyers may have more opportunities to provide moral advice to clients, but 
their dependence on one client, their employer, may make it even more 
difficult to offer detached, independent counseling.56 
Gillian Hadfield, commenting on the Brandeis story, highlights the 
distinction between a robust conception of client counseling and the kind of 
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highly technical legal services requiring expertise in economics and finance 
that now typify large law-firm practice: 
This is not to say there is no role for lawyers to act as an ethical 
breakwater when advising corporations about whether to facilitate 
Chinese government censorship of Internet search results, to manipulate 
their books to defraud investors and employee pension funds, or to resist 
fair settlement of employment discrimination claims.  But it is to say that 
these normative considerations are of a fundamentally different character 
from the economic considerations, which dominate the work of the 
majority of lawyers today, of how to structure the delivery of Internet 
services in a country that lacks both physical and market infrastructure, 
how to design financial instruments that better diversify risk, or how to 
structure a more competitive employee benefits package to improve 
retention.57 
Herein lies the dilemma:  if the core value of the legal profession, which 
justifies its monopoly over the provision of legal services, is concern for 
justice and morality, and there is little market demand for services directed, 
at least in part, at the realization of justice and morality, then the market and 
professional core values will work at cross-purposes. 
II. 
This preliminary discussion provides some background for the themes 
animating the articles presented at the Colloquium at Fordham Law School 
on October 18, 2013.  One common theme among many of the conference 
presentations is that the profession may be losing its de facto monopoly 
over the provision of legal services, even as the official proponents of the 
professional nomos—i.e., courts and bar associations—continue to maintain 
that they are the only institutions competent to regulate lawyers.  
Professional regulators may be closing the corral gate long after the horses 
have run away.  As William Henderson argues, “[T]he legal profession is 
becoming a subset of a larger legal industry that is increasingly populated 
by nonlawyers, technologists, and entrepreneurs.”58  The American 
profession is under further pressure due to the globalization of the market 
for legal services.59  Now, large multinational business clients can select 
lawyers in the United Kingdom, Australia, or elsewhere who are just as 
capable as American lawyers at providing the services required by 
transnational corporations, but who operate with fewer restrictions on 
capital structures and can therefore practice more efficiently.  Finally, 
information technology enables the “unbundling” of legal services into 
discrete tasks and creates the infrastructure necessary for the domestic and 
global outsourcing of legal services, including the practice of so-called 
virtual law firms comprised of lawyers in different U.S. states and around 
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the world.  New York Times columnist Tom Friedman has written that 
“anything that can be digitized can be outsourced to either the smartest or 
the cheapest producer, or both.”60  The ability to digitize information has 
allowed firms to decompose or “unbundle” legal services into component 
parts, and find more efficient ways of handling some of the more routine 
tasks that traditionally have been performed by lawyers.61  A litigated 
matter or deal is composed of subtasks, some of which require highly 
specialized training, skills, and judgment, but others of which are simply 
commodity work.  Coding documents for electronic discovery, for example, 
is highly routine and standardized.62  If legal matters can be broken down 
into subtasks, clients may begin to demand (as many clients already have) 
that lawyers charge prices for routine tasks that are set in a competitive 
market with many potential service providers.63 
If nonlawyers are involved in the provision of what traditionally have 
been considered legal services, there may be a risk that their involvement 
will compromise some of the core values of the legal profession.  This is an 
argument often raised against third-party financing of legal services, the 
topic of the first two articles discussed at the Colloquium, and one of the 
subissues considered by the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20.64  Over 
half of U.S. states have now relaxed common law prohibitions on 
champerty and maintenance, allowing nonparties to provide financial 
assistance to a litigant in exchange for a right to share in the proceeds of the 
lawsuit.65  The Working Group on Alternative Litigation Finance 
considered the ethical issues for lawyers that may arise in connection with 
the representation of a client making use of alternative litigation financing, 
concluded that the risks are manageable, and prepared a white paper 
analyzing the legal issues.66  One of the issues left unresolved in the white 
paper is the extent to which a third party may exercise control over 
decisionmaking connected with an ongoing litigated matter.  The High 
Court of Australia, in Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Ltd. v Fostif Pty Ltd., 
commonly known as Fostif, was willing to permit an outside investor to 
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exercise considerable control over the conduct of litigation, including the 
selection of counsel and the decision of whether to settle.67  A court in the 
United States would be highly unlikely to go as far as Fostif, but it remains 
uncertain how much control a litigation financier could exercise.  As noted 
above, U.S. law is quite comfortable with a significant degree of control in 
the hands of liability insurers.  Should third-party litigation funding 
companies be permitted to exercise control to the same extent?  Anthony 
Sebok considers this question by focusing on the professional value 
allegedly threatened by third-party control, i.e., independence.68  To say 
lawyers are independent, of course, merely raises the question, 
“independent from what?” and the answer has been, at different times and 
given by different lawyers and scholars, independent from the state, from 
courts, from the legislative and executive branches, from financial 
considerations, and from the interests of clients.  Professor Sebok usefully 
approaches this question by asking what it is that lawyers provide to clients 
that nonlawyers cannot (or do not) provide.  Given the value of client 
autonomy, the bar has the burden of articulating something that lawyers 
provide to clients that clients may not, on their own volition, choose to give 
up.  In her article, also considering alternative litigation financing, Michele 
DeStefano approaches the issue from an empirical angle, based on 
interviews with general counsels at large American business corporations.69  
She finds a significant demand by corporate clients for compliance advisors 
who were often insulated from oversight by the general counsel’s office.  
These officers may be practicing attorneys, but often are not.  Professor 
DeStefano analogizes claim funding to corporate compliance advising, 
because both may involve the provision of legal advice by nonlawyers.  If 
both are demanded by sophisticated entity clients (often with in-house legal 
counsel), one might reasonably conclude that the bar’s monopoly is 
disserving at least one sector of clients. 
As the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 was holding hearings and 
deliberating, some observers wondered why alternative litigation financing 
was within the Commission’s mandate, which was to consider the need for 
changes to the Model Rules in light of globalization and information 
technology.70  The answer is a certain amount of concern that “the British 
[and to a lesser extent, the Aussies] are coming!”  Taking a page from the 
book of regulatory competition scholars,71 some American lawyers and 
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academics believe that different regulatory regimes may offer a competitive 
advantage to non-U.S. law firms.  Tom Morgan, for example, warns:  “If 
American lawyers ignore the fact that their direct competitors play by 
different rules, they will have only themselves to blame when clients take 
advantage of these changes and seek the same or better professional 
services at lower cost elsewhere.”72  Australian lawyers, for example, are 
permitted to practice in publicly held law firms, perhaps giving them an 
edge accessing capital, which they can use to their competitive advantage if 
it enables them to provide the same services to clients at lower cost relative 
to other large-firm competitors.73  If lawyers from other jurisdictions are 
going to eat our competitive lunches because American lawyers are hobbled 
by overly restrictive rules of professional conduct, perhaps the rules should 
be modified to reduce this competitive disadvantage.  In the background of 
the regulatory-competition debate lies a prior issue that is sometimes under-
appreciated.  That issue concerns the identity of the “direct competitors” to 
which Morgan alludes.  Within the domestic market, competitors to lawyers 
are perceived to be accountants and consultants, investment bankers in the 
corporate client sector, and such relatively local and small-scale service 
providers as solo and small-firm accountants and real estate brokers in the 
individual client sector.74  From a comparative perspective, it can be 
surprisingly difficult to define the occupational group in other countries that 
corresponds to the American legal profession.  In Japan, for example, the 
licensed-lawyer (bengoshi) profession is strikingly small, but there are 
numerous allied occupational groups such as judicial scriveners, patent and 
tax agents, and law-trained corporate employees, which provide the type of 
legal services that would be the exclusive domain of American lawyers.75  
Out-of-court legal advising in connection with litigation may be performed 
by judicial scriveners in Japan, while giving advice to business corporations 
on compliance with law is largely the province of law-trained quasi-lawyers 
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who have not passed the bar exam or graduated from the Legal Training 
and Research Institute (LTRI).76 
Laurel Terry’s contribution to this Colloquium accordingly considers the 
scope of the legal profession’s monopoly in other countries.77  She 
challenges the conventional wisdom that lawyers outside the United States 
have a monopoly only over courtroom advocacy (as in the case of bengoshi 
in Japan and barristers in England and Wales, with some qualifications), 
with an open competitive field outside the courtroom.  The story on the 
ground is much more complicated than the conventional wisdom suggests, 
and a great deal remains unknown.  At the very least, one should be 
skeptical of lawyer-equivalent titles and look functionally at which 
occupational group is performing certain tasks, regardless of what title is 
used. 
Carole Silver considers the globalization of legal education in her 
article.78  Lawyers are producers in the market for legal services, so law 
schools must be understood as being part of a market for producers of 
producers.  If there is competition in the market for legal services, then 
presumably educational institutions might compete to produce lawyers (or 
nonlegal service providers) to meet the needs of clients.  Law schools in the 
United States compete to attract applicants from overseas, and as Silver 
demonstrates, the American model of legal education has been remarkably 
influential internationally.  But the open question has been whether the 
ABA would recognize legal education obtained outside the United States as 
satisfying the education prerequisite for bar admission.  Once again, 
Australia is noteworthy for its entrepreneurial energy in the global market 
for legal services, with the Australian Law Council seeking to qualify its 
country’s graduates pursuing admission to practice in the United States.  In 
2012, however, the ABA’s Special Committee on Foreign Law School 
Accreditation unanimously voted not to pursue further the possibility of 
accrediting law schools located outside U.S. territory.79  In light of the 
difficulties facing many U.S. law schools, including precipitously declining 
enrollments and a tight job market for recent graduates,80 the ABA’s 
reluctance to open up the American job market to competition from foreign-
trained lawyers is perhaps understandable.  Silver’s and Terry’s arguments, 
taken together, is that antitrust and free trade norms in an increasingly 
global marketplace will continue to exert pressures on producers (lawyers) 
and producers of producers (law schools) regardless of the inaction of the 
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organized bar, which may find itself in the position of merely rearranging 
deck chairs on the Titanic while the bar crashes into the iceberg of 
globalization. 
A similarly disruptive effect—this time, of technology—was the theme 
of an article by Benjamin Barton and another coauthored by John McGinnis 
and Russell Pearce.81  To put these articles in context, consider the claim 
made by Richard Susskind, that the legal profession is undergoing a 
transformation from providing a mostly “bespoke” product.  That is, from 
custom-crafted, one-off, highly labor-intensive services tailored to the needs 
of a particular client with respect to a particular matter, toward an 
increasingly standardized product that can be delivered more efficiently 
using process, technology, and automation.82  The move toward the 
delivery of more commoditized products is being driven by clients, who are 
not willing to pay Saville Row prices when they can obtain a product off-
the-rack that suits their needs (even if it is not custom tailored).  Where 
there is demand for a product or service, someone is likely to provide it, and 
the last decade has seen significant growth among firms providing legal 
support, electronic discovery and due diligence support, and legal process 
outsourcing (LPO) services.83  Professor Barton’s article identifies a 
dynamic that occurs in any market in which a disruptive technology is 
introduced.84  As work that was previously performed on a custom basis is 
challenged by mass-produced, cheaper, standardized substitutes, legacy 
producers who cannot compete on price hunker down and defend their 
model of bespoke production.  At first, this is a successful strategy, as the 
new entrants take only the segment of the market in which consumers are 
highly price sensitive and not primarily concerned about quality.  As 
Professors McGinnis and Pearce note, some “superstar” producers of 
customized products will even be able to command a premium for their 
services.85  But look out!  Eventually the low-cost producers figure out a 
way to provide high-quality goods or services, and do so in the more 
efficient manner they have pioneered.  When this happens, the dinosaur 
firms are unable to compete on price or quality, so they attempt to use 
influence and lobbying to defend their turf.86  The emerging discipline of 
legal analytics, enabled by significant advances in machine intelligence 
(think of Watson, the Jeopardy-playing computer developed by IBM), has 
enabled lawyers to do better than ever at conducting discovery, predicting 
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the results of litigation (and therefore facilitating settlement), and enabling 
lawyers to improve document drafting by using a database of benchmark 
contracts.87  These articles thus tell a regulatory-capture story familiar from 
public-choice theory.88 
Because the antonym of a captured regulatory agency is one that acts in 
the public interest, seemingly marginal issues, such as the regulation of the 
unauthorized practice of law, present important normative matters 
concerning the nature of the public interest in the regulation of the legal 
profession.  The profession must appeal to public values in order to justify 
its monopoly, but as Laurel Rigertas argues, it tends to focus too narrowly 
on some values to the exclusion of others.89  There is no doubt that 
regulation can be justified as a means of ensuring the quality of some 
product or service; the Food and Drug Administration, for example, 
legitimately prescribes standards for the labeling of pharmaceuticals, 
because most consumers are not sufficiently knowledgeable about medicine 
and the formulation of drugs to know of the associated risks.  Similarly, 
professional regulators can require that would-be lawyers graduate from 
law school and pass the bar exam, because prospective clients have no other 
way of knowing whether someone who holds herself out as a provider of 
legal services is competent.  But overbroad regulation may interfere with 
consumer choice.  Products liability law, for example, tries to avoid the 
imposition of safety standards that mandate a particular risk-versus-utility 
tradeoff if there are consumers for whom it would be rational to forego the 
benefit of a safety feature.90  Every first-year torts student learns the Hand 
formula, B < PL, indicating that there is a duty to take some safety 
precaution only when doing so would cost less than the expected accident 
costs if the precaution were not taken multiplied by the probability of the 
accident occurring.91  Applying this analysis to the legal profession’s 
monopoly, suppose there were some nonlawyer or software product that 
could do a pretty good job preparing a divorce petition in a relatively 
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uncomplicated situation.92  Hypothetically, imagine that there was a 5 
percent chance that a consumer who used the nonlawyer would suffer a 
$10,000 loss caused by negligence, and that a consumer who instead 
retained a fully licensed lawyer would have only a 1 percent likelihood of 
experiencing a loss due to negligence.  When would a risk-neutral consumer 
opt for the lawyer?  The answer is when the price differential between 
services provided by a lawyer and nonlawyer is less than $400, which is the 
savings in the expected cost of errors due to negligence.  In terms of 
reduction in error costs, it is worth it to spend $300 more on a lawyer, but 
not to spend $500 more.  Fully informed consumers ought to be able to 
make this type of purchasing decision, and they could if professional 
regulation were aimed at reducing information costs, rather than eliminating 
competition from nonlawyers entirely. 
Along these lines, another theme that emerged in the Colloquium is that 
the claim by the profession to a legitimate monopoly over the provision of 
legal services rests on empirically unsupported premises.  Consider the 
consumer protection rationale.  A district court accepted the bar’s proffered 
justification for enforcing UPL restrictions against LegalZoom—namely, 
that if nonlawyers are permitted to provide legal services, “there is a clear 
risk of the public being served in legal matters by ‘incompetent or 
unreliable persons.’”93  Deborah Rhode has long argued that the profession 
has, at best, only anecdotal evidence for this claim,94 and her recent 
research shows that relatively few complaints come to state UPL regulators 
from consumers who have been harmed by poor quality services.95  As 
Leslie Levin shows in her contribution to this Colloquium, there is evidence 
that clients represented by lawyers get better results in litigated disputes 
than clients who are unrepresented, but what little evidence is available 
suggests that lawyers do not do better than representatives with no legal 
training.96  Citing a study by Herbert Kritzer, she observes that formal legal 
training is less important than experience with both the subject matter and 
the players involved in the process.97  Contrary to the “myth of 
omnicompetence,”98 it may be the case that professional expertise is highly 
differentiated.  Merely being admitted to practice law does not guarantee 
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one’s competence at any particular task, let alone one’s comparative 
advantage over nonlawyer professionals at performing that task.99 
The next set of articles considers the professional monopoly and core 
values debate in the context of the failure of the ABA Commission on 
Ethics 20/20 to submit even a very limited alternative business structures 
(ABS) reform to the House of Delegates.  The Commission may be faulted 
for not seeking to innovate in the area of law-practice structures, but it may 
also be forgiven for not wanting to relive the experience of the acrimonious 
debate over multidisciplinary practices (MDPs) from over a decade ago.100  
As John Dzienkowski’s article shows, however, regardless of what 
regulators do, some innovation is bound to be the product of pressure from 
corporate clients to reduce the costs of legal services.101  He discusses six 
different companies that have been formed to offer corporate consumers of 
legal services alternatives to large law firms.  Some, like Clearspire and 
VLP Law Group, are merely law firms reengineered for greater efficiency, 
for example, by eschewing fancy downtown office space for remote 
locations or lawyers who work at home.  Others, such as Paragon and 
AxiomLaw, provide, among other things, solutions to short-term staffing 
crunches by making lawyers available on a project-by-project basis.  It is 
not yet clear how “disruptive” these new models of law firm organization 
will be, as they represent mostly marginal tinkering with existing models.  
Yet, they appear not to have attracted the kind of concerted opposition that 
doomed the ABS and MDP proposals.  Moreover, one gets the impression 
that corporate clients will be able to use their economic clout and the 
expertise of in-house counsel’s offices to get whatever they want from their 
outside providers of legal services.  As Dzienkowski notes, despite the 
ABA’s resistance to allowing even limited experiments with alternative 
practice structures, “corporate clients have increasingly relied upon the 
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nonlawyer-controlled delivery of certain types of legal services.”102  
Middle-income consumers have no equivalent leverage in the market.  
Deborah Rhode and Lucy Ricca accordingly consider the situation of 
relatively unsophisticated consumers of legal services in the individual-
client hemisphere.103  They recommend a regulatory approach that aims 
directly at consumer protection and quality assurance.104  In the 
immigration area, for example, consumers are often victimized by 
nonlawyers who call themselves notaries, seeking to capitalize on consumer 
confusion with the prestige of the legitimate civil law profession of 
notario.105  This type of fraud could be controlled to some extent by 
expanding licensing for qualified nonlawyer immigration advocates, as is 
presently done in Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom.106  Jessica 
Dixon Weaver, however, questions the conventional wisdom that 
nonlawyer-provided legal assistance, including filing forms in matrimonial 
cases, will improve access to justice without harming pro se litigants.107 
The penultimate panel continued this theme of the effects of 
fragmentation of the legal profession and, consequently, the 
decentralization of regulation.  Jack Sahl’s article comes at the issue from 
two different directions.108  First, he looks at a limited move toward what 
has been called a “driver’s license” model of state regulation, in which a 
new applicant will be admitted to practice in a particular state, but then will 
be permitted to practice in any other state, just as my New York driver’s 
license entitles me to drive in Texas.  The Commission on Ethics 20/20 
considered and rejected a proposal modeled on Colorado’s rule permitting 
lawyers admitted in other states to practice in Colorado as long as they do 
not establish an office in the state.109  Sahl describes a resolution by the 
Conference of Chief Justices aimed at making it easier for the spouses of 
military service members to become admitted to practice without taking the 
bar exam.  He advocates for extending similar rights to other moving 
lawyers, and, wisely given the failure of the driver’s license proposal in the 
Commission on Ethics 20/20, advocates state-by-state action on this reform.  
The subject of the second half of Sahl’s article is more radical, and was the 
subject of a great deal of discussion at the Colloquium:  the rule recently 
adopted by the Washington Supreme Court permitting practice by limited 
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license legal technicians (LLLTs).110  Unlike familiar allied professionals 
like paralegals and nurse practitioners, LLLTs can operate without being 
under the supervision of a lawyer admitted to practice in Washington State.  
Many LLLTs are expected to practice in the domestic relations area, in 
which there are significant unmet needs for legal services.111  The 
Washington experiment bears watching to see whether LLLTs can deliver 
competent legal services at a lower cost than lawyers—that is, whether it is 
Weaver or Rhode and Ricca whose hypothesis is supported by the empirical 
evidence. 
One theme of regulatory reform has been a critique of the assumption by 
the ABA and state courts that there should be a one-size-fits-all approach to 
regulation.  For example, conflict-of-interest rules do not differentiate 
between large and small law firms, even though relatively rigid rules may 
impose significantly higher costs on large firms, particularly those with 
multinational operations.112  Proposals for reform often treat the two 
hemispheres of legal practice in isolation from each other, seeking (broadly 
speaking) further access to justice in the individual-client hemisphere and 
client autonomy in the corporate-client hemisphere.  Dana Remus’s article 
questions the conventional wisdom that professional regulation ought to 
vary by context and, in particular, whether fragmented approaches to 
regulation may exacerbate problems caused by the interaction between 
lawyers in the different hemispheres of practice.113  Her article seeks to 
hold onto something in the concept of “lawyer” that transcends the 
particular areas in which lawyers might practice.  In other words, what are 
the core values that constitute the legal profession, or what normatively 
speaking separates lawyers from nonlawyer providers of legal services?  
The answer sounds like a tautology, but in fact has content:  the legal 
profession is committed to the values underlying the legal system, which 
may not reduce to the values of nonclients, such as efficiency and 
autonomy.  Lawyers must provide competent services, even if clients may 
desire to spend less on them, and they must remain independent from the 
ends of clients, even if clients would prefer to have more control over their 
legal service providers.  Professor Remus’s article accordingly cautions 
regulatory reformers not to lose sight of what makes lawyers distinctive in a 
market they share with accountants, consultants, information-technology 
specialists, and even machines.114 
Finally, the last two articles consider law as information, and ask what 
rights citizens have to receive it.  Bridgette Dunlap criticizes the efforts of 
the United States to promote the rule of law in developing countries for 
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being excessively lawyer centric.115  Suppose the United States succeeds in 
also exporting its unified legal profession and zealous enforcement of 
UPL—the result will not be to the benefit of disempowered citizens.  “The 
model that the United States seeks to export has proven, at home and 
abroad, to concentrate power in the hands of those with the money and 
power to access judicial systems.”116  The rule of law is not the same thing 
as democracy, let alone a well-functioning democracy characterized by 
accountability, transparency, and lack of corruption.  Picking up again on 
the theme of access versus quality, Dunlap makes the important point that 
full participation in society requires a threshold level of legal knowledge, 
but the organized bar’s focus on providing quality services has led to the 
perception that law is the exclusive domain of lawyers.117  In the domestic 
context, Renee Newman Knake argues that many regulations impede the 
flow of legal information.  These regulations may be constitutionally 
questionable, particularly after the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated a 
Vermont statute that prohibited the sale of drug-prescribing information by 
doctors118 and the Virginia Supreme Court vacated professional discipline 
against a lawyer who had blogged about his cases, revealing client 
information in the process.119  If legal information receives the same level 
of protection as political or artistic speech, a number of settled doctrines 
may have to be reconsidered under the First Amendment.120  There is 
already a substantial body of constitutional case law on attorney advertising 
and solicitation, to which a recent Second Circuit case is a valuable 
addition,121 but what other areas of lawyer regulation might be affected?  
Knake proposes a distinction between regulations that wholly foreclose a 
particular avenue of distribution and those that are aimed at competence, 
confidentiality, or other ends short of prohibition on communications.122  
Interestingly, she regards the fee-splitting rule, supporting bans on 
nonlawyer ownership interests in law firms, as potentially vulnerable to a 
constitutional challenge.123  It is true that the core concern of the rule, at 
least traditionally, was with communication—namely, the impermissible 
solicitation of clients using “runners” or “cappers.”124  Not only has the 
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Court held that solicitation may be fairly aggressively regulated by 
states,125 but it is a stretch to read the First Amendment as reaching the 
capital structure of law firms.  Perhaps this kind of outside-the-box thinking 
is what is needed to shake up the profession’s complacency about its 
monopoly over legal services. 
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